The USSR intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and the current Allied US-led intervention in the same country have many different characteristics but also a lot of common features. The causes and the final goals for setting them in motion differ as much as their initial approaches but with the passage of time they have both grown into counterinsurgency operations. Both of them have gone into their tenth year, although the respective political elites have expected a quick and short intervention. Equally so, although militarily superior, the intervening forces have soon become operationally inferior, so that due to misunderstanding the environment, insufficient coordination and weak interior allies, with inadequate political framework, insufficient engagement of resources and inaccessible ground, all in all, finally limited to maintaining status quo. The political part has failed in the first place. The withdrawal has had devastating consequences for the Soviets. The present American withdrawal is a two-edged sword because the majority of tasks have not been fulfilled and there can be no doubt as to whether the long term deployment is not the right solution. It is important to analyze and compare the two operations in order to be able to detect the successful steps as well as the opportunities missed and draw conclusions on the continuation of the allied operation; for the Allies, as stated correctly by the historian Paul Robinson, have found themselves in a position quite similar to the Soviet case. The purpose of the research is twofold. First, to analyze the essential characteristics of the political dimension of counterinsurgency operation through the activity of the intervening force towards counterinsurgency operation centers of gravity; the second is to offer recommendations for the correct use of the principles of counterinsurgency operation.
keywords:
counterinsurgency operation USSR US insurgents local
population allies centers of gravity Intervencija SSSR-a u Afganistanu od 1979. do 1989. godine i trenutačna saveznička intervencija pod vodstvom SAD-a u istoj zemlji u mnogočemu se razlikuju, ali imaju i puno toga zajedničkog. Uzroci i krajnji ciljevi zbog kojih su započete razlikuju se, kao i početni pristupi, no protokom vremena obje su prerasle u protupobunjeničke operacije. Obje su ušle u desetu godinu, iako su političke elite očekivale brze i kratkotrajne intervencije. Isto tako, u oba slučaja vojno superiorne, intervenirajuće snage ubrzo su postale operativno inferiorne, pri čemu su, zbog nerazumijevanja prilika, nedovoljne koordinacije, ali i slabog unutrašnjeg saveznika, uz neadekvatan politički okvir, nedovoljno angažirane resurse i nepristupačan teren, osuđene tek na održavanje statusa quo. Zakazao je u prvom redu politički dio. Povlačenje je za Sovjete imalo razarajuće posljedice. Danas započeto povlačenje Amerikanaca, dok većina zadataka nije ispunjena, dvosjekli je mač, no dugotrajni vojni boravak na terenu nije rješenje. Važno je analizirati i usporediti ove dvije operacije kako bismo detektirati uspješno provedene korake kao i propuštene prilike te izvukli zaključke za nastavak savezničke operacije jer – kako povjesničar Paul Robinson ispravno zapaža – saveznici se danas nalaze u sličnoj poziciji u kojoj su bili Sovjeti. Svrha je istraživanja dvostruka. Prva je analizirati bitna obilježja političke dimenzije protupobunjeničke operacije, ponajprije djelovanje intervenirajućih sila prema centrima gravitacije protupobunjeničke operacije, a druga dati preporuke za pravilnu primjenu načela protupobunjeničke operacije.
keywords:
protupobunjenička operacija SSSR SAD pobunjenici lokalno
stanovništvo saveznici centri gravitacije